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AND THE WALLPAPER COMES CRUMBLING DOWN:
POLLUTION EXCLUSION CLAUSE RELIEVES
INSURER OF DUTY TO DEFEND IN
STAMFORD WALLPAPER CO. v.
TIG INSURANCE
I. INTRODUCTION
The enactment of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) 1 has
had unexpected ramifications in the business world.2 Pursuant to
CERCLA, which regulates the cleanup of existing, inactive and
abandoned hazardous waste disposal sites, 3 potentially responsible
parties (PRPs) are liable for cleanup and response costs. 4 Consider-
1. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter CERCLA]. For the text of select provisions
of CERCLA, see infra notes 3-4 & 22.
2. See Theresa Gooley, The Changing Environment: Interpreting the Pollution Ex-
clusion in the Context of CERCLA Liability, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 153, 154 (1995) (explain-
ing that application of CERCLA retrospectively resulted in substantial unplanned
liability on businesses); Richard L. Bradford, The Personal Injury Endorsement: An
Unwarranted Straining to Obtain Insurance Coverage for Environmental Damage, 11 J.
LAND USE & ENm-L. L. 111, 111 (1995) (discussing immense damages assessed
against corporations for hazardous waste cleanup).
3. See CERCLA § 102(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9602(a). Under section 102(a), the Ad-
ministrator shall:
[P]romulgate and revise as may be appropriate, regulations designating
as hazardous substances.., such elements, compounds, mixtures, solu-
tions, and substances which, when released into the environment may
present substantial danger to the public health or welfare or the environ-
ment, and shall promulgate regulations establishing that quantity of any
hazardous substance the release of which shall be reported pursuant to
section 9603 of this title. The Administrator may determine that one sin-
gle quantity shall be the reportable quantity for any hazardous substance,
regardless of the medium into which the hazardous substance is released.
Id.
4. See CERCLA § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). Section 107(a) defines a "cov-
ered person," or PRP, for the purposes of liability under CERCLA, as follows:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances
were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport
for disposal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or pos-
sessed by such person, by any other party or entity, at any facility or
incineration vessel owned or operated by another party or entity and
containing such hazardous substances, and
(517)
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ing the enormous costs associated with hazardous waste cleanup,
PRPs have willingly paid colossal premiums for Comprehensive
General Liability (CGL) insurance policies to shield them from
CERCLA liability.5 Consequently, if named as a PRP for hazardous
waste claims, the insureds turn to their insurance carriers to pro-
vide a legal defense during ensuing litigation. 6 Since an insurer's
duty to defend arises only if the policy covers the conduct specifi-
cally at issue in the litigation, questions have arisen as to whether
the insurance policy's pollution exclusion clause precludes cover-
age, and therefore nullifies the insurer's duty to defend. 7
In Stamford Wallpaper Co. v. TIG Insurance,8 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed an insurer's duty
to defend its insured for environmental damage claims under CER-
CLA.9 Specifically, the Second Circuit interpreted the insurance
contract language, concentrating on the pollution exclusion clause
and the "sudden and accidental" exception, to determine whether
the insurer had a duty to defend. 10 The Stamford Wallpaper court
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or
sites selected by such person, from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of
a hazardous substance, shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State...
(B) any other necessary costs or response incurred by any other per-
son consistent with the national contingency plan ....
Id.
CERC[A defines "person" as "an individual, firm, corporation, association,
partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Govern-
ment, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any inter-
state body." Id. § 101 (21), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21).
5. See Chen Min Juan, Environmental Litigation: Coverage Under the Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance Policy, 16J. ENERGY NAT. REsOURCES & ENVTL. L. 423, 424
(1996) (discussing high costs associated with liability for hazardous waste cleanups
under CERCLA). For a discussion of Comprehensive General Liability (CGL) pol-
icies, see infra notes 26-33 and accompanying text.
6. See id. PRPs also request indemnification for damages incurred for envi-
ronmental cleanup of hazardous wastes. See id. This desire to rely on insurance
providers is not surprising since the costs of hazardous waste cleanup, already stag-
geringly high, are increasing. See id.
7. See Missionaries of the Co. of Mary v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 A.2d 21, 25
(Conn. 1967) (holding insurer breached duty to defend action which, on face of
complaint, appeared within policy coverage). The determination of whether an
insurer has a duty to defend depends on whether the complaint in that action
states facts which appear to bring the claim of damage within the policy coverage.
See id. For a detailed discussion of the insurer's duty to defend, see infra notes 26-
85 and accompanying text.
8. 138 F.3d 75 (2d Cir. 1998).
9. See id. at 79-81.
10. See id.
2
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concluded that the insurer had no duty to defend the insured be-
cause the insured's pollution-related activities fell outside the scope
of coverage of the CGL insurance policy.'
This Note will discuss an insurance carrier's duty to defend its
insured for hazardous waste cleanup under CERCLA. Part II dis-
cusses the background surrounding CGL insurance policies and the
relevant analysis undertaken in a duty to defend action.12 Part III
presents the facts of Stamford Wallpaper.13 Part IV discusses the hold-
ing and reasoning of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Stam-
ford Wallpaper.'4 Part V presents a critical analysis of the decision of
the Second Circuit. 15 Finally, Part VI concludes with a discussion of
the potentially negative impact the Second Circuit's opinion will
have on the insurance industry. 16
II. BACKGROUND
A. CERCLA
On December 11, 1980, President Carter signed CERCLA into
law.17 The increase of hazardous substance leakage from aban-
doned waste disposal sites prompted CERCLA's enactment.' 8 CER-
11. See id. at 81. For a discussion of the "sudden and accidental" exception to
the pollution exclusion clause, see infra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
12. For a discussion of the relevant historical background surrounding the
duty to defend, and the relevant analysis undertaken in a duty to defend action,
see infra notes 26-85 and accompanying text.
13. For a discussion of the facts of Stamford Wallpaper, see infra notes 86-106
and accompanying text.
14. For a discussion of the holding and reasoning of the Second Circuit, see
infra notes 107-32 and accompanying text.
15. For a critical analysis of the court's opinion in Stamford Wallpaper, see infra
notes 133-54 and accompanying text.
16. For a discussion of the impact the Second Circuit's opinion in Stamford
Wallpaper will have on the insurance industry, see infra notes 155-61 and accompa-
nying text.
17. See Melody A. Hamel, The 1970 Pollution Exclusion in Comprehensive General
Liability Policies: Reasons for Interpretations in Favor of Coverage in 1996 and Beyond, 34
DUQ. L. REv. 1083, 1084-85 (1996) (discussing CERCLA's legislative history). In
response to growing concerns regarding contamination of sites by hazardous
wastes, President Carter signed this bill as his administration was coming to an
end. See id.
18. See COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., A LEGIS-
LATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION,
AND LIABILITY Acr OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), at V (Comm. Print 1983). The original
proposal was submitted to deal with leaking waste disposal sites, among other envi-
ronmental concerns, including oil spills and spills of hazardous substances. See id.
While these latter two concerns received congressional attention in the Clean
Water Act, the concern about leakage from abandoned waste disposal sites,
prompted by the Love Canal, New York, incident, as well as other similarly high-
profile occurrences around the country, was addressed by CERCLA. See id.
1999] 519
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CLA's ultimate goal was to initiate a nationwide cleanup of
hazardous waste sites contaminated by toxic chemical and waste
disposal.19
CERCLA imposes strict liability on PRPs.2° CERCLA's liability
scheme authorizes the United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) to recover remediation costs from PRPs, as well as to
order the PRPs to cleanup hazardous sites.2 1 PRP liability is not
limited to current site operators; past site owners, offsite waste gen-
erators and waste transporters may also be held liable. 22
In 1992, Congress estimated that the cleanup costs for hazard-
ous waste sites was approximately $500 billion.23 The cost of clean-
ing up a particular site could be as high as $25 million, with the cost
of studies and investigations on the site amounting to an additional
For a discussion of the Love Canal incident in New York, see Julie Mauer, The
Availability of the Affirmative Defenses of Assumption of Risk and the "Sale Defense"
Against Common Law Public Nuisance Actions: United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plas-
tics Corp., 30 NAT. RESOURCES J. 941, 941-43 (1990) (focusing on public nuisance
liability for environmental harm).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17-21 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6119-23 (stating goal of CERCLA was to "inventory... inactive
hazardous waste sites and to establish a program for appropriate environmental
response action to protect public health and the environment from the dangers
posed by such sites"). CERCLA established two mechanisms for implementing its
provisions: a federal fund, and a strict liability scheme. See Hamel, supra note 17, at
1085 (discussing CERCLA's implementation mechanisms).
20. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985)
(discussing that responsible parties are held strictly liable under CERCLA even
though explicit provision for strict liability was not included in compromise). A
PRP includes any "covered person" defined under section 107(a). CERCLA
§ 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). For the text of section 107(a), see supra note 4.
21. See CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607. The amount of potential damages
in a CERCLA action are set out in section 107(c) (1), which provides that:
[T]he liability under this section of an owner or operator or other re-
sponsible person for each release of a hazardous substance or incident
involving release of a hazardous substance shall not exceed-
(D) for any incineration vessel or any facility other than those specified in
subparagraph (C) of this paragraph, the total of all costs of response plus
$50,000,000 for any damages under this subchapter.
Id. § 107(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(c)(1).
22. See id. § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a).
23. See Chen Min Juan, supra note 5, at 424. CERCLA was originally funded at
$1.6 billion over five years. See id. This amount was increased to $8.5 billion in
1985. See id.; Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L.
No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.
§ 9601-75 (1994)) [hereinafter SARA].
4
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$3 million. 24 With the potential for such vast liability, PRPs secured
insurance policies to shield themselves from CERCLA liability25
B. Role of Insurance
Business entities purchase CGL policies from insurance carri-
ers to offset, among other losses, potential losses from environmen-
tal cleanup liability.2 6 In an effort to avoid paying huge CERCLA
damage claims, insurance companies asserted that CGL policies did
not provide coverage for CERCLA liability.2 7 In 1970, insurers
added the "pollution exclusion" clause to CGL policies in an at-
tempt to limit pollution-related liability. 28 Insurers incorporated
pollution exclusion clauses into CGL policies in order to "eliminate
24. See Chen Min Juan, supra note 5, at 424.
25. SeeJerold Oshinsky & Judith Hall Howard, Emerging Areas in Insurance Cov-
erage Litigation in the 1990's and Beyond, in INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION: RECOV-
ERY IN THE 1990S AND BEYOND, at 9, 17 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course
Handbook Series No. H4-5279, 1998) (stating that, according to EPA, approxi-
mately 250 to 275 million tons of hazardous industrial chemical waste produced
annually in United States are disposed of improperly).
26. See GRACE A. CARTER & KEITH A. MEYER, ENVIRONMENTAL INSURANCE HAND-
BOOK, § 3.2.1, at 30 (1992). CGL policies provide policyholders with coverage for
a variety of liabilities they may incur to third parties. See id. A CGL policy affords
protection against bodily injury and property damage. See generally BARRY R. Os-
TRACER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES
§ 7.01 (9th ed. 1998). The basic policy most insurers use provides that the insur-
ance company will pay on behalf of the insured all sums to which the insured is
liable as damages because of bodily injury or property damages. See id.
27. See Hamel, supra note 17, at 1089-90. Of the estimates for the total cost of
cleanup for all contaminated sites in the United States, the insurance industry's
share of this bill is currently estimated between $48 and $91 billion, with a best
estimate totaling $66 billion. See id. at 1090; see also Gooley, supra note 2, at 154.
Because insurance companies were reluctant to provide pollution liability coverage
to businesses, "CERCLA 'set the stage for the long and ongoing battle between
insurers and their insureds over whether existing liability policies should cover
losses due to pollution.'" Id. (quoting Michael C. Praett, Environmental Cleanup
Costs and Insurance: Seeking a Solution, 24 GA. L. REV. 705, 710 (1990)).
28. See E. Joshua Rosenkranz, The Pollution Exclusion Clause Through the Looking
Glass, 74 GEO. L.J. 1237, 1241 (1986). For the text of a typical pollution exclusion
clause, see infra note 55.
Coverage during the early stages of the standard CGL policy was "accident-
based," in which the policy only covered property damage and personal injury
caused by an accident. See Rosenkranz, supra, at 1241. The insurance industry
switched to "occurrence-based" coverage when confronted with customer demands
for more extensive coverage. See id. at 1246. Courts have defined "occurrence" as
.an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, which re-
sults, during the policy period, in bodily injury or property damage neither ex-
pected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured." Id. at 1246-47 (citation
omitted). The insurers again changed their policies with the increase in environ-
mentally related litigation. See id. at 1251. They added the pollution exclusion
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any doubt that may have existed concerning coverage for damages
caused by the emission of pollutants as a regular or continuous part
of the insured's business."29 However, an exception to these exclu-
sions typically permitted coverage for pollution occurrences charac-
terized as "sudden and accidental."30 Because courts have differed
in their construction of the phrase "sudden and accidental," no na-
tional uniformity in coverage exists under these policies.31
Insurers regularly asserted that certain pollution-related claims
fell within the pollution exclusion clause, and therefore refused to
defend their insureds. 32 In response, insureds filed claims for relief
and asked courts to determine whether the insurers had a duty to
defend them against environmental damage claims. 33
29. American States Ins. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 587 F. Supp. 1549, 1553
(E.D. Mich. 1984) (holding that insurers had no duty to defend).
30. See G. Van Velson Wolf, Jr., Insurance Claims and Recovery for Environmental
Cleanup Costs Including Case Law in Arizona, California, Washington and Colorado, in
THE IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW ON REAL ESTATE AND OTHER COMMERCIAL
TRANSACTIONS, at 1133, 1138 (ALI-ABA Course of Study, Sept. 1997). The "sudden
and accidental" exception, usually located at the end of the pollution exclusion
clause, provides that the "[pollution] exclusion does not apply if such discharge,
dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental." Id. For the language of a
pollution exclusion clause, see infra note 55.
31. See Chen Min Juan, supra note 5, at 442. Insurance companies thought
that most courts completely disregarded the meaning of "sudden." See id. at 442.
Consequently, insurers created the absolute pollution exclusion clause, in which
all damages are excluded without exception for sudden and accidental releases.
See id.
The typical absolute pollution exclusion clause precludes coverage for
"[p]ersonal injury, bodily injury or property damage arising out of the actual, al-
leged, or threatened discharge, dispersal, release or escape of pollutants into or
upon land, the atmosphere or any watercourse, whether or not such discharge, disper-
sal, release or escape was sudden and accidental." Id. (citing Irene A. Sullivan et al.,
Hazardous Waste Litigation: Comprehensive General Liability Insurance Coverage Issues, in
1 TWELFTH ANNUAL INSURANCE, EXCESS AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES, at
425, 564 (1995) (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 518,
1995)).
32. See Rosenkranz, supra note 28, at 1252-53. In drafting the pollution exclu-
sion clause, insurers intended to relieve themselves of liability for pollution related
claims. See id. However, courts have not always construed the pollution exclusion
clause so as to effect this intent. See id. The authors listed four problems of inter-
pretation that have contributed to this confusion:
The first has been in deciding from whose perspective to view the dis-
charge when determining whether it was sudden and accidental. The
second problem has been the courts' inconsistency in analyzing the inter-
play between the occurrence limitation and the pollution exclusion. The
third problem stems from the courts' injection into the analysis of an
"actual" or "active" polluter concept. The fourth problem, unique to haz-
ardous waste disposal, has been the issue of when a hazardous waste gen-
erator might forfeit insurance coverage because of the acts of its disposer.
Id. at 1254.
33. See, e.g., New York v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 786 (2d Cir. 1994) (bringing
action against insurer to provide defense for toxic dumping claim); Avondale In-
6
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C. Duty to Defend
CGL policies typically provide that the insurer shall have the
right and duty to defend any suit against its insured in which dam-
ages are sought for either bodily injury or property damage. 34 The
scope of an insurer's duty to defend is determined by comparing
the complaint with the policy language.3 5 If the allegations con-
tained in the complaint "bring the claims actually, or even poten-
tially, within the coverage of the policy," the insurer will be
obligated to defend the action. 36  Generally, this approach is
termed the "four corners of the complaint" test.
3 7
dus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d 1200, 1202 (2d Cir. 1989) (requesting
insurer to defend insured in action for illegal dumping); Remington Arms Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp. 1406, 1408 (D. Del. 1992) (seeking declaratory
relief against insurer to compel defense in EPA suit).
34. See John E. Heintz et al., Insurance Coverage for Environmental Claims, in
INSURANCE COVERAGE LITIGATION: 1994, at 27, 35 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice
Course Handbook Series No. H4-5209, 1994) (discussing insuring language uti-
lized in determining duty to defend).
An example of a standard duty to defend provision states:
The company . .. will pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the
insured ... shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury or property damage to which this insurance applies, caused
by an occurrence, and the company shall have the right and duty to de-
fend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of bodily
injury or property damages even if any allegations of the suit are ground-
less, false or fraudulent.
Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-0396432S, 1995 WL
462270, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1995).
35. See Susan Randall, Redefining the Insurer's Duty to Defend, 3 CONN. INS. L.J.
221, 227 (1997); see also Danek v. Hommer, 100 A.2d 198, 202 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1953) (stating complaint should be laid alongside policy and determination
made as to whether insurer will be required to pay resulting judgment if allega-
tions are sustained).
36. International Minerals & Chem. Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 522 N.E.2d
758, 761-62 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988) (citations omitted). In International Minerals, the
plaintiff asserted that its insurer had a duty to defend it against CERCLA claims
based on contamination at its reconditioning site. See id. at 761. The International
Minerals court determined that the "duty to defend an action against an insured
stems from the commitment to defend expressly undertaken in the contract of
insurance." Id. After examining the allegations and comparing them to the pol-
icy language, the court concluded that the insurer had no duty to defend since the
plaintiffs allegations did not fall within the policy coverage. See id. at 761-69. But
see Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Barthelemy, 33 F.3d 189, 194 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding
insurance company obligated to defend when claim potentially is within coverage);
Carey Canada, Inc. v. California Union Ins. Co., 748 F. Supp. 8, 16 (D.D.C. 1990)
(same).
37. See OSTRAGER & NEWMAN, supra note 26, § 5.02 (stating duty to defend is
generally determined by allegations of complaint); see also Randall, supra note 35,
at 226. The four corners of the complaint rule is also known as the "four corners
rule," the "eight corners rule," the "exclusive pleading rule" and the "scope of the
allegations test." See id. One commentator explained that "[u]nder the complaint
rule, the existence of the duty to defend is ascertained, whether by the insurer or
1999]
7
Tita: And the Wallpaper Comes Crumbling Down: Pollution Exclusion Claus
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
524 VILLANovA ENVIRONMENTAL LAw JouRNAL [Vol. X: p. 517
The relevant analysis in determining the insurer's duty to de-
fend an environmental contamination claim is a three-step pro-
cess. 38 First, analyze the construction of the insurance policy's
language. 39 Second, analyze the plain language of the pollution ex-
clusion clause.40 Finally, determine whether the allegations in the
complaint fall even possibly within coverage, thereby triggering a
duty to defend.41
1. Insurance Contract Construction
State courts generally construe the terms of an insurance pol-
icy according to the rules of contract construction.42 In Linemaster
Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Casualty Corp.,43 the Superior Court of
by a court in a declaratory judgment proceeding, by comparing the complaint and
the policy language." Id. at 227.
The rule that the insurer's duty to defend is determined by the "four corners
of the complaint" is widely followed. See, e.g., Duff Supply Co. v. Crum & Forster
Ins. Co., No. CIV.A.96-8481, 1997 WL 255483, at *4 (E.D. Pa. May 8, 1997);
Lusalon, Inc. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 511 N.E.2d 595, 598 (Mass.
1987); Waste Management of Carolinas, Inc. v. Peerless Ins. Co., 340 S.E.2d 374,
378 (N.C. 1986); Cal-Farm'Ins. Co. v. TAC Exterminators, Inc., 218 Cal. Rptr. 407,
413 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).
38. Although the duty to defend analysis is not explicitly stated as a three-
prong test, courts examine an insurer's duty to defend under a three-step analysis.
See, e.g., Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-0396432S,
1995 WL 462270, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1995) (beginning analysis with
insurance contract interpretation, then applying contract interpretation to pollu-
tion exclusion clause, and finally, determining whether allegations fall within com-
plaint). For a detailed discussion of the Linemaster opinion and its three-step
process, see infra notes 43-46, 69-72 & 83-85 and accompanying text.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.; see also Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp.
1406 (D. Del. 1992) (analyzing canons of insurance contract interpretation under
Connecticut law, applying those canons to policy, then determining if insurer has
duty to defend). For a detailed discussion of the Remington Arms case, see infra
notes 47-54 & 65-68 and accompanying text.
42. See Hammer v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 573 A.2d 699, 769-70 (Conn.
1990) (utilizing general contract rules to interpret insurance policy); A.M. Larson
Co. v. Lawlor Ins. Agency, Inc., 220 A.2d 32, 34-35 (Conn. 1966) (same).
State law governs the interpretation of insurance contracts. See United States v.
Kimbell Foods Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728-29 (1979) (holding some actions, of proper
nature, are to be decided under state law). Generally, when the law of the state
court is uncertain or ambiguous, federal courts must predict how the highest court
of the state would resolve that uncertainty or ambiguity. See New York v. Blank, 27
F.3d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing Minotti v. Lensink, 798 F.2d 607, 610-11 (2d
Cir. 1986)). Federal courts look to the state's constitution, statutes, and decisional
law to ascertain the applicable state law. See id. When there is no decision by the
state's highest court, federal courts must apply what they find to be the state law
after giving proper regard to the relevant rulings of other courts of the state. See
id. (citing Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967)). Finally,
federal courts may also consider relevant cases from other jurisdictions. See id.
43. No. CV91-0396432S, 1995 WL 462270 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1995).
8
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Connecticut addressed an insurer's duty to defend its insured
against environmental claims.44 Relying on prior Connecticut case
law, the Linemaster court noted that the insurance policy must be
viewed as a whole, and all relevant provisions must be considered in
connection with one another.45 The Linemaster court stated -that
"' [e]very provision is to be given effect ... and no word or clause
eliminated as meaningless, or disregarded as inoperative, if any rea-
sonable meaning consistent with the other parts of the policy can
be given to it.' ,4
6
In Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,4 7 the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Delaware analyzed the three canons of
insurance policy interpretation under Connecticut law.48 The first
canon states that "'[w] here an insurer sets up a special exclusion
for the purpose of withdrawing from the coverage a specific liability
it was unwilling to provide indemnity for, the burden is on the in-
surer to prove that exception.'- 49 The second canon states that "in-
surance policies are to be construed in accordance with ordinary
parlance."50 The third canon states that an insurance policy "'must
44. See id. at *1. In Linemaster, the plaintiff corporation filed a partial sum-
mary judgment motion against the defendant insurance company, claiming that
the defendant breached its duty to defend the plaintiff in actions brought by EPA
and the Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection for groundwater
contamination. See id. The plaintiff also requested the court to enter a declaratory
judgment that the defendant had a duty to defend in the ongoing environmental
actions. See id.
45. See id. at *4 (citing Downs v. National Cas. Co., 152 A.2d 316, 319 (Conn.
1959)).
46. Id. (quoting Downs, 152 A.2d at 319).
47. 810 F. Supp. 1406 (D. Del. 1992).
48. See Remington Arms, 810 F. Supp. at 1409-12. In Remington Arms, the in-
sured, a firearms manufacturer, sought declaratory relief and damages against its
insurer regarding the insurer's duty to defend. See id. at 1408. EPA brought claims
against the plaintiff for the cleanup of environmental contamination at three sites
in Connecticut. See id. The defendant insurer moved for summary judgment,
claiming that the pollution exclusion clause in the CGL policies removed its duty
to indemnify and defend the plaintiff. See id. The Delaware district court applied
Connecticut law and interpreted the pollution exclusion clauses contained in the
policies issued by the defendant. See id. at 1408-12.
49. Id. at 1410 (quoting Firestine v. Poverman, 388 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D.
Conn 1975)). See EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 898 F. Supp. 952, 961 (D. Conn.
1995) (holding that insurer must demonstrate that allegations in underlying com-
plaint are solely and entirely within policy's exclusionary clauses); R.E.O., Inc. v.
Travelers Cos., No. CV 950372522S, 1998 WL 285836, at *5 (Conn. Super. Ct. May
20, 1998) (stating that when exclusion clause is relied upon to deny coverage, bur-
den of proof is on insurer to demonstrate that allegations of complaint place it
solely and entirely within policy exclusions and are subject to no other interpreta-
tion); see also Heintz, supra note 34, at 33 (explaining that burden of proof is on
insured to show exclusionary clauses do not apply).
50. Remington Arms, 810 F. Supp. at 1410. The language of the insurance pol-
icy "must be accorded its natural and ordinary meaning and courts cannot indulge
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be construed as a whole, and all of its relevant provisions are to be
considered in connection with one another.' '"51 The Remington
Arms court applied the canons of construction and determined that
because the CGL policy's exclusion clause was ambiguous, the in-
surer did not meet its burden of proof, and therefore had a duty to
defend.52
The canons of insurance contract interpretation are applied to
the pollution exclusion clause to determine whether the policy lan-
guage is clear and unambiguous. 53 More specifically, the "sudden
and accidental" exception, the clause that courts have found to be
the most difficult to interpret, must be analyzed to determine if it is
clear and unambiguous. 54
in a forced construction ignoring provisions or so distorting them as to accord a
meaning other than that evidently intended by the parties." Id. (quoting Hammer
v. Lumberman's Mut. Cas. Co., 573 A.2d 699, 704 (Conn. 1990)). However, if
construing the language in accordance with ordinary parlance creates uncertainty,
any ambiguity in an insurance policy is construed against the insurer. See id. (cit-
ing Schultz v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 569 A.2d 1131, 1135 (Conn. 1990)). The rule
that the contract is to be construed against the insurer is an application of the rule
contra proferentem. See 2 COUCH ON INSURANCE § 22:14 (3d ed. 1995-96 & Supp.
1998) (discussing policy of contra proferentem); Eugene R. Anderson & James J.
Fournier, Why Courts Enforce Insurance Policyholders' Objectively Reasonable Expectations
of Insurance Coverage, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 335, 342 (1998) (same); see also Linemaster
Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-0396432S, 1995 WL 462270, at
*3 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1995). In discussing insurance contract construction,
the Superior Court of Connecticut stated that "'[i]f the terms of an insurance
policy are plain and unambiguous, they are to be accorded their natural and ordi-
nary meaning ....'" Id. (quoting Raffel v. Travelers Indem. Co., 106 A.2d 716, 718
(Conn. 1954)). If the policy language is ambiguous, then the construction that is
most favorable to the insured must be adopted. See id. The Linemaster court con-
cluded that "'when the words of an insurance contract are, without violence, sus-
ceptible of two interpretations, that which will sustain the claim and cover the loss
must, in preference, be adopted.'" Id. (quoting Raffel, 106 A.2d at 718).
51. Remington Arms, 810 F. Supp. at 1410 (quoting Firestine v. Poverman, 388
F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Conn. 1975)). If possible, each provision of an insurance
policy is to be given effect and no word or clause eliminated as meaningless, or
disregarded as inoperative, if it can be given any reasonable meaning consistent
with the other parts of the policy. See id. (citing Hammer, 573 A.2d at 704).
52. See id. at 1416-17. The Remington Arms court concluded that genuine is-
sues of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiffs claims concerning one of
the sites came within the policy coverage, thus triggering the insurer's duty to de-
fend. See id. at 1417. The district court specifically determined that the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion was ambiguous, and there-
fore, the ambiguity was to be construed against the insurer. See id. at 1460. As a
result, the ambiguity created a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
claims came within the policy coverage and prevented the insurer's claim from
being decided as a matter of law. See id.
53. For a discussion of the canons of insurance contract interpretation, see
supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
54. See Linemaster, 1995 WL 462270, at *27 (noting that because of its varied
interpretations, "sudden and accidental" exception is most litigated part of pollu-
tion exclusion).
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2. Pollution Exclusion Interpretation
The "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution exclu-
sion clause excludes coverage for pollution-related liability except
when the cause of the pollution is sudden and accidental. 55 Courts
have struggled to define the terms "sudden" and "accidental."56
The Linemaster court stated that " [t] here has been a veritable legion
of cases attempting to interpret this phrase, and it has been said
that 'the exception to the pollution exclusion for discharges that
are "sudden and accidental" is easily the most often litigated part of
the standard pollution exclusion."57
Most courts, both federal and state, disagree about the proper
interpretation of "sudden."58 Insurers argue that the plain mean-
55. See id. (explaining scope of sudden and accidental exception to pollution
exclusion clause). A typical pollution exclusion clause and "sudden and acciden-
tal" exception provides in relevant part:
[coverage] does not apply to bodily injury or property damage arising out
of the discharge, dispersal, release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot,
fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemicals, liquids, or gases, waste materials or
other irritants, contaminants or pollutants into or upon land, the atmos-
phere or any water course or body of water, but this exclusion does not apply
if such discharge, dispersal, release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Irene A. Sullivan & Timothy G. Reynolds, Hazardous Waste Litigation: Comprehensive
General Liability Insurance Coverage Issues, in LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRAC-
TICE COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES LITIGATION, at 279, 331 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Prac-
tice Course Handbook Series No. 386, 1997)(emphasis added).
56. See Nicholas J. Guiliano, The Sudden and Accidental Exception to the Pollution
Exclusion Solution, 13 TEMP. ENVIL. L. & TECH. J. 261, 274-86 (discussing disparity
between states' interpretations of "sudden and accidental"). To interpret the
meaning of "sudden and accidental" some courts resort to the dictionary defini-
tion and invariably find irreconcilable dictionary definitions of "sudden":
Webster's Third New International Dictionary attaches a number of defi-
nitions to "sudden." Webster's first defines "sudden" as "happening with-
out previous notice . . . occurring unexpectedly . . . not foreseen."
Webster's then lists synonyms for "sudden" that include "prompt" and
"immediate." Random House Dictionary of the English Language de-
fines the word "sudden" in a temporal sense as "happening, coming,
made, or done quickly." Black's Law Dictionary defines "sudden" as
"[h]appening without previous notice or with very brief notice; coming
or occurring unexpectedly; unforeseen; unprepared for." Although "sud-
den" can reasonably be defined to mean abrupt or immediate, it can also
reasonably be defined to mean unexpected and unintended.
Id. at 275-76 (footnotes omitted).
57. Linemaster, 1995 WL 462270, at *27. Due to the increasing number of
lawsuits against polluters, the insurance industry first attempted to limit its pollu-
tion-related coverage by creating the pollution exclusion clause. See Rosenkranz,
supra note 28, at 1239. The purpose was to limit insurance coverage to occur-
rences that were sudden and accidental. See id. at 1240. Surprisingly, the courts
have uniformly ignored the insurers' intent and distorted the phrase "sudden and
accidental" beyond recognition. See id.
58. See Sullivan & Reynolds, supra note 55, at 332-35. A small majority of
courts conclude that the phrase "sudden and accidental" is clear and unambigu-
ous. See id. at 332. A large number of courts interpret "sudden" as having a tempo-
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ing of the word "sudden" includes a temporal element, meaning
"abrupt" or "of short duration."59 A significant number of courts
have determined that the "sudden and accidental" exception is un-
ambiguous, and have precluded coverage if the release of pollution
is not quick or instantaneous. 60
Policyholders, however, argue that "sudden" is ambiguous. 61
They cite the word's conflicting dictionary definitions as evidence
that there is more than one reasonable interpretation of "sudden
ral element, and interpret "accidental" to mean "unintended or unexpected." See
id. Some courts conclude "sudden" is ambiguous, meaning both "unexpected or
unintended" and "abrupt," and therefore construe the ambiguity against the in-
surer. See id. at 333. A few courts refuse to apply the "sudden and accidental"
exception as a matter of law, holding that factual issues remained as to whether the
pollution occurred in a manner which was "sudden and accidental." See id. at 334.
For opinions that find "sudden and accidental" unambiguous, and preclude
coverage if the damage-producing pollution is not instantaneous, see infra note 60.
For cases that hold "sudden" is ambiguous, and do not exclude gradual discharges
from coverage, see infra note 63.
59. See Hamel, supra note 17, at 1092. Insurers point out that the plain mean-
ing rule is a canon of insurance contract construction. See id. According to the
rule, words are to be given their plain, everyday meaning if they are unambiguous
on their face. See id. The insurers also rely on the canon that all terms are to be
given meaning and effect. See id. at 1093. They argue that since "accidental" al-
ready connotes unexpectedness, a definition of "sudden" without a temporal com-
ponent would render "accidental" redundant, and therefore superfluous. See id.
60. See Mesa Oil, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 123 F.3d 1333, 1340 (10th
Cir. 1997) (applying New Mexico law to find that ongoing oil spillage could not be
sudden and accidental so pollution exclusion applied); Snyder Gen. Corp. v. Cen-
tury Indem. Co., 113 F.3d 536, 539 (5th Cir. 1997) (applying Texas law and hold-
ing that "sudden," as used in pollution exclusion exception, contained temporal
component); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Flanders Elec. Motor Serv., Inc., 40 F.3d 146,
152 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Missouri law and holding that "sudden" unambigu-
ously means abrupt, quick or immediate as well as unexpected and unintended);
United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Morrison Grain Co., 999 F.2d 489, 493 (10th
Cir. 1993) (applying Kansas law to define "sudden" as quick and without warning,
and holding property damage caused by improper pesticide storage ineligible for
coverage); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. United States Fidelity & Guar., Co.,
962 F.2d 1484, 1491 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Utah law and holding that dump-
ing condensed liquid waste in unlined earthen pit for fifteen years was not sudden
and accidental because "sudden" cannot mean gradual, routine or continuous);
Hyde Athletic Indus., Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 969 F. Supp. 289, 299 (E.D. Pa.
1997) (stating that process of pollution occurring over period of years did not
constitute "sudden and accidental" releases); North Pac. Ins. Co. v. Mai, 939 P.2d
570, 572 (Idaho 1997) (holding that "sudden and accidental" unambiguously re-
fers to unintended happenings that take place over short period of time); Iowa
Comprehensive Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Fund Bd. v. Farmland
Mut. Ins. Co., 568 N.W.2d 815 (Iowa 1997) (ruling that "sudden" requires abrupt
event and leak occurring over ten years did not fall within exception).
61. See Hamel, supra note 17, at 1092. The definitions of "sudden" in some
standard dictionaries include a temporal element such as "abruptness," while
others focus exclusively on unexpectedness. See id. at 1092-93. Policyholders
therefore argue that because ambiguities in an insurance contract are to be con-
strued against the insurer, courts should adopt the construction that favors cover-
age. See id. Also, policyholders point out that redundancies are common in
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and accidental" in the context of the pollution exclusion clause. 62
Some courts have agreed, holding that the term "sudden" is ambig-
uous, does not necessarily imply a temporal element and that grad-
ual discharges are not excluded from coverage. 63
The Connecticut Supreme Court has yet to address the inter-
pretation of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion clause. 64 In Remington Arms, however, the District Court
for the District of Delaware considered how the Connecticut
Supreme Court would interpret the "sudden and accidental" excep-
tion.65 The Remington Arms court examined other relevant opinions
and determined that "sudden" meant only "unexpected," and did
not possess a temporal element.66 Under this interpretation of
"sudden," coverage would not be barred for discharges merely be-
cause those discharges occurred over an extended period of time. 67
Therefore, the Remington Arms court concluded that "for the pollu-
tion exclusion [clause] to remove coverage under Connecticut law
there must be a deliberate discharge of a substance .... "68
insurance policy terminology and point to strings of terms in the pollution exclu-
sion itself, such as "smoke, vapors, fumes, chemicals, and gases." See id.
62. See id. For dictionary definitions of the term "sudden," see supra note 56.
63. See Patz v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 15 F.3d 699, 704 (7th Cir. 1994)
(applying Wisconsin law and holding that "sudden and accidental" can be read
broadly to mean unintended or unexpected); Broderick Inv. Co. v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 954 F.2d 601, 607 (10th Cir. 1992) (applying Colorado law and
holding that "sudden and accidental" is ambiguous and therefore precludes sum-
mary judgment for insurer); Hutchinson Oil Co. v. Federated Serv. Ins. Co., 851 F.
Supp. 1546, 1557 (D. Wyo. 1994) (applying Wyoming law and holding that leaking
oil at insured's plant over 20 years may be sudden and accidental, triggering in-
surer's duty to defend); MAPCO Alaska Petroleum, Inc. v. Central Nat'l Ins. Co.,
784 F. Supp. 1454, 1458-60 (D. Alaska 1991) (applying Alaska law and holding that
focus of "sudden and accidental" is on unexpected or unforeseen nature of event);
Outboard Marine Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1218 (Ill. 1992)
(holding "sudden" means only unexpected or unintended, not abrupt).
64. See Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp. 1406, 1408
(D. Del. 1992). The Remington Arms court stated that "[n] either the parties nor the
Court could discover any Connecticut case law concerning the proper construc-
tion to be given the pollution exclusion clauses." Id. Thus, the insurer's motion
presented an issue of first impression under Connecticut law. See id. For the facts
of Remington Arms, see supra note 48 and accompanying text.
65. See Remington Arms, 810 F. Supp. at 1410-12.
66. See id. at 1410-11. In reaching this conclusion, the Remington Arms court
looked to the decisions of the Third Circuit in New Castle County v. Hartford Accident
&Idem. Co., 933 F.2d 1162 (3d Cir. 1991) and New Castle County v. Hartford Accident
& Idem. Co., 970 F.2d 1267 (3d Cir. 1992). See Remington Arms, 810 F. Supp. at
1410. Since "sudden" was reasonably capable of two widely different interpreta-
tions, the Remington Arms court found the term ambiguous. See id. at 1410-11. Ac-
cording to the canons of insurance contract interpretation, ambiguity over the
meaning of the terms must be resolved in favor of the insured. See id. at 1411.
67. See Remington Arms, 810 F. Supp. at 1411.
68. Id. at 1412.
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The Superior Court of Connecticut, however, reached a differ-
ent result in Linemaster.69 In determining the scope of the "sudden
and accidental" exception, the superior court began by examining
the public policy and historical background of the clause. 70 The
Linemaster court determined that under a plain reading of the pol-
icy language, the term "sudden" necessarily includes a temporal ele-
ment and could not cover pollution that did not occur somewhat
instantaneously. 71 The court refused to look beyond the unambig-
uous contract language and, therefore, concluded that "sudden
and accidental" did not cover discharges that gradually occurred
over a period of time.72
3. Four Corners of the Complaint Analysis
Given the relevant insurance policy language, a court must
next consider whether an insurance company has a duty to de-
fend. 73 To make this determination, a court must analyze the com-
69. See Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-
0396432S, 1995 WL 462270, at *30 (Conn. Super. Ct. July 25, 1995). For the facts
of Linemaster, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
70. See id. at *28-29. By inserting the pollution exclusion clause into the CGL
policy, insurance companies attempted to limit their liability. See id. at *28. By
introducing the "sudden and accidental" language into the policy, the insurers
hoped to even further limit the once broad extent of coverage. See id. at *29.
The Linemaster court found it important to foster environmental protection as
a matter of public policy. See id. In order to promote environmental protection,
insurers must be willing to assume some of the risks. See id. Therefore, in order
for insurers to keep functioning in this area, it is important that they write policies
that do not provide coverage for gradual pollution. See id. If an insured knew that
his policy covered gradual pollution, the insured would be more likely to inten-
tionally engage in such conduct. See id. at *28.
71. See id. at *30. The Linemaster court noted that insurers included the term
"sudden" to impose a temporal element, and considerations of public policy be-
yond the short-term financial interests of the insurance industry support such a
result. See id.
72. See id. The Linemaster court rejected the Remington Arms decision, finding
that by examining the pollution exclusion clause and its "sudden and accidental"
language in isolation from the whole contract, the Remington Arms court ignored
the third canon of insurance contract construction. See id. at 31. For a discussion
of the canons of contract interpretation in the Remington Arms case, see supra notes
48-51 and accompanying text.
73. See, e.g., Linemaster, 1995 WL 462270, at *5 (analyzing policy's language
and then considering language of complaint). For a discussion of the duty to de-
fend analysis, see supra notes 3941 and accompanying text. Most states hold that
the duty to defend is broader than the duty to indemnify. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
v. SCA Serv., Inc., 588 N.E.2d 1346 (Mass. 1992). In SCA Services, a CGL insurer
brought an action seeking declaration that it was not obligated to defend or in-
demnify its insured in an action brought for damages caused by hazardous waste
leaking out of a landfill in which its insured disposed of waste. See id. at 1346. The
SCA Services court explained that the duty to defend is broader than the duty to
indemnify and liability ultimately depends upon the true facts. See id. at 1349; see
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plaint filed against the insured to determine whether it states facts
that appear to bring the alleged injury within the coverage of the
policy.7 4 Connecticut courts have held that "[i]f an allegation of
the complaint falls even possibly within the coverage, then the in-
surance company must defend the insured. '75
In New York v. Blank,76 the Second Circuit considered whether
insurance companies have a duty to defend their insured, under
New York law, for claims brought pursuant to CERCLA. 77 The
also Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Barbara B., 846 P.2d 792, 795 (Cal. 1993) (holding
duty to defend is broader than duty to indemnify); Outboard Marine Corp. v. Lib-
erty Mut. Ins. Co., 607 N.E.2d 1204, 1212 (Ill. 1992) (same). But see Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Ins. Co., 483 A.2d 402 (N.J. 1984). In
Hartford Accident, the New Jersey Supreme Court examined an insurer's duty to
defend and concluded that the insurer's duty to defend is a contractual undertak-
ing of the insurer. See id. at 403, 405. As such, it can be as limited or as broad as
the insurer sees fit to provide through its policy. See id. at 405; see also Burd v.
Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 7, 9-10 (N.J. 1970) (holding that duty to defend and
duty to indemnify are equally broad).
Although a suit against an insured may be groundless, CGL policies establish
the insurer's duty to defend the insured for pollution-related injuries and dam-
ages. See Chen Min Juan, supra note 5, at 435 (discussing insurer's duty to defend
insured for pollution damages under CGL policy); see also Missionaries of the Co.
of Mary, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 230 A.2d 21, 24 (Conn. 1967) (holding that
duty to defend does not depend on whether injured party will prevail against
insured).
74. See FJS Corp. v. United Nat'l Ins. Co., No. 326450, 1998 WL 144820, at *2
(Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 19, 1998) (discussing four corners of complaint test used in
duty to defend analysis).
75. City of West Haven v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 639 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D.
Conn. 1986) (holding insurer breached contract by refusing to defend).
76. 27 F.3d 783 (2d Cir. 1994).
77. See id. In Blank, the State of New York commenced suit against Abalene
Pest Control Service, Inc., Walter Blank, the sole shareholder and president of
Avalene, and Orkin Exterminating Co., for contamination of a waste disposal site
by buried pesticides. See id. at 786. Abalene and Blank brought a third-party ac-
tion against DEC, their waste removal contractor. See id. at 787. Abalene and
Blank also sought to hold their insurance companies, Capital Mutual Insurance
Company, New York Mutual Underwriters and National Union Fire Insurance
Company, liable for the cost of their defense and for indemnification of any dam-
ages imposed in the underlying action. See id.
A case applying New York law is relevant to this inquiry since the law gov-
erning interpretation of insurance contracts is believed to be identical in New York
and Connecticut. See EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 366 (D. Conn.
1995). The District Court for the District of Connecticut explained this reasoning
as follows:
Two considerations support this conclusion. First, there are no reported
Connecticut cases construing a pollution exclusion clause. As such, this
Court may presume that Connecticut law is the same as that of New York,
especially since the view of the New York court seems to represent the
emerging majority view on the interpretation of pollution exclusion
clauses. Second.... the Court finds the language of the pollution exclu-
sion clause to be plain and unambiguous. This rule in Connecticut, as in
New York, is that courts are to apply the plain meaning of the words in a
contract provision where the words are clear and unambiguous.
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Blank court approached the duty to defend analysis by examining
the CGL policy's pollution exclusion clause.7 8 The Second Circuit
held that the policy language in the pollution exclusion clause and
its exception for "sudden and accidental" discharges was clear and
unambiguous. 79
Next, the Blank court looked to the complaint's allegations to
determine whether the pollution exclusion applied to the alleged
facts. 80 The Second Circuit concluded that the allegations of the
complaint did not preclude the possibility that unintentional dis-
charges occurred during a short period of time.81 Since the insur-
ers failed to meet their burden of demonstrating that there was no
reasonable possibility of coverage, the Blank court determined that
the insurers were obligated to defend their insured.8 2
In Linemaster, the Superior Court of Connecticut reached the
opposite result.8 3 The Linemaster court analyzed the language of
the "sudden and accidental" exception included in the insured's
CGL policy, and determined that the plain language of the clause
Id. at 370 (citing Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 762 F. Supp. 548, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1991)) (citations omitted).
78. See Blank, 27 F.3d at 788. The insurers argued that the alleged discharge
of pesticides at the site was not "sudden and accidental," and therefore the allega-
tions fell within the pollution exclusion clauses contained in the policies. See id.
Thus, the insurers asserted that they had neither a duty to defend nor to indemnify
Abalene and Blank. See id.
79. See id. at 789. The Blank court found the language of the exclusion sub-
ject to no reasonable interpretation other than that intentional discharges are gen-
erally excluded from coverage. See id.
80. See id. at 789-90. Under the law, the question of the insurer's duty to de-
fend "'rests solely on whether the underlying complaint alleges any facts or
grounds which bring the action within the protection purchased."' Id. at 790
(quoting Seaboard Sur. Co. v. Gillette Co., 476 N.E.2d 272, 275 (N.Y. 1984)). The
insurer's duty to defend will be triggered unless it can demonstrate that all of the
complaint's allegations fall entirely within the exclusion and are subject to no
other interpretation. See id. Therefore, any evidence extrinsic to the complaint is
irrelevant. See id.
81. See id. at 791. The Blank court stated that "although the complaint is
framed in general terms and embraces conduct occurring over a period of several
years, the complaint is by no means limited to allegations of continuous dis-
charge." Id. The general and broad allegations of the complaint did not preclude
the possibility that property damage was caused, if even in part, by the "sudden and
accidental" discharge of pesticides. See id.
82. See id.; see also Avondale Indus., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 887 F.2d
1200, 1205 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that pollution exclusion clause merely ex-
cludes coverage for intentional pollution under New York law).
83. See Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-
0396432S, 1995 WL 462270, at *38 (Conn. Super. July 25, 1995)). For the facts of
Linemaster, see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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was clear and unambiguous. 84 The Linemaster court concluded that
since none of the discharges were "sudden and accidental" the alle-
gations of the complaint did not fall within the policy coverage, and
therefore the insurer had no duty to defend the plaintiffs environ-
mental contamination claims.85
III. FACTS
In Stamford Wallpaper Co. v. TIG Insurance, the Second Circuit
examined whether the plaintiffs CGL policy, issued by the defend-
ant insurance company, covered environmental damage claims,
thereby imposing a duty to defend upon the defendant.8 6 As part
of its wallpaper manufacturing process, Stamford, a Connecticut
corporation, used liquid mineral spirits which generated waste sol-
vents. 87 In 1974, Stamford contracted with hazardous waste re-
moval companies (carters) to remove these waste solvents.88
Stamford purchased CGL insurance from TIG Insurance
(TIG), a New York insurance corporation.89 From 1974 until 1983,
the period relevant to this action, the CGL policy terms remained
constant.90 According to the policy, TIG has the "right and duty to
defend any suit against the insured seeking damages on account of
... bodily injury or property damage, even if any of the allegations
of the suit are groundless, false, or fraudulent."91 The policy also
contained a standard pollution exclusion clause, with a "sudden
and accidental" exception.92
84. See id. at *30. Specifically, the Linemaster court determined that a plain
reading of the policy language supports the notion that "sudden" is to be given a
temporal definition. See id. For a discussion of the Linemaster court's analysis of
the "sudden and accidental" exception, see supra notes 69-72 and accompanying
text.
85. See id. at *33. The court held that the pollutant discharges occurred over
a period of time and were the result of regular business operations. See id.
86. Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 75.
87. See id. at 77. Stamford used the mineral spirits from 1970 until 1983. See
id.
88. See id. at 77-78. Specifically, Stamford contracted with Drum Automation,
Inc., Chemical Waste Removal Service, Inc. and Solvents Recovery Service of New
England to dispose of its waste. See id. The carters recycled these waste materials
and sold them back to both Stamford and third parties. See id. at 78.
89. See id. TIG Insurance (TIG) is headquartered in Texas. See id.
90. See id.
91. Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 78.
92. See id. The specific pollution exclusion clause at issue in Stamford Wall-
paper excludes from coverage any liability for the following:
bodily injury or property damage arising out of the discharge, dispersal,
release or escape of smoke, vapors, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, toxic chemi-
cals, liquids or gases, waste materials or other irritants, contaminants or
pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water course or body
1999]
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Each carter that Stamford retained was alleged to be a source
of hazardous waste at sites EPA designated as hazardous landfills. 93
EPA notified Stamford that it was potentially liable under CERCLA
for response action costs. 9 4 Consequently, Stamford was included
as a third-party defendant in an action against the landfill owners
and the carters for the costs of the hazardous waste cleanups.95
Stamford notified TIG of the claims filed against it as a third-
party defendant. 96 TIG, invoking the policy's pollution exclusion
clause, disclaimed any duty to either defend or indemnify Stamford
for these claims. 97 In response, Stamford filed an action against
TIG seeking damages for breach of contract.98
In an unpublished decision, the district court held that the
claims against Stamford all fell within the scope of the policy's pol-
lution exclusion clause, and that none of the allegations brought
the claims within the "sudden and accidental" exception.99 The dis-
trict court also concluded that none of the CERCLA claims were for
bodily injury or property damage, and absent such claims, TIG had
of water; but this exclusion does not apply if such discharge, dispersal,
release or escape is sudden and accidental.
Id.
93. See id. The landfills designated as hazardous included the Davis Landfill
in Smithville, Rhode Island; the Gallups Quarry in Plainfield, Connecticut; and
Solvents Recovery Service of New England in Southington. See id. Stamford ar-
gued that "none of the residual by-products of its waste were commingled with
other waste materials or deposited at any of these three sites." Id.
94. See id. EPA notified Stamford by PRP letter on June 12, 1992, that it was
potentially liable for costs of $3.35 million at the Solvents Recovery Service in
Southington, Connecticut. See id. On April 1, 1993, Stamford received another
notification from EPA that it was potentially liable for response action costs of
$257,441 in connection with the Gallups Quarry cleanup in Plainfield, Connecti-
cut. See id.
95. See id. at 78. Stamford was named as a third-party defendant in United
States v. Davis, filed on Feb. 22, 1993. See id. This was a CERCLA cost-recovery
action arising from the cleanup of the Davis Landfill in Rhode Island. See id.
96. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 78. Stamford notified TIG of the claims
on June 16, 1993. See id.
97. See id. On December 14, 1993, TIG asserted it had no duty to defend
Stamford for claims arising from any of the three sites, relying on the pollution
exclusion clause found in its CGL policy. See id.
98. See id. On December 8, 1994, Stamford filed suit against TIC in Connecti-
cut state court. See id. However, TIG removed the case to the United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Connecticut. See id. Stamford moved for partial
summary judgment on the question of TIG's duty to defend Stamford against the
environmental damages claims. See id.
99. See id.
18
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no duty to defend. 100 Accordingly, the district court dismissed
Stamford's claim for breach of contract.1°1
Stamford appealed the district court's decision regarding the
applicability of the pollution exclusion clause. 10 2 TIG cross-ap-
pealed, arguing that the district court's decision should be affirmed
regardless of any exclusion. 103 The Second Circuit held that the
policy's pollution exclusion clause excluded claims brought against
Stamford seeking to impose liability for environmental loss caused
by the disposal of waste Stamford generated, and the carters dis-
posed of, at other sites. 10 4 The Stamford Wallpaper court also held
that none of the claims against Stamford fell within the "sudden
and accidental" exception to the pollution exclusion clause. 10 5
Thus, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Stamford's breach of contract claim and held that TIG had no duty
to defend Stamford against these environmental claims. 10 6
IV. NARRATIVE ANALYSIS
The Second Circuit began its analysis in Stamford Wallpaper by
discussing the lower court's application of substantive Connecticut
law. 10 7 The Stamford Wallpaper court determined that an insurer's
duty to defend is broader than its duty to indemnify under Con-
necticut state law.'10  The court stated that "'[w] here a complaint
100. See id.
101. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 78. The court also dismissed Stam-
ford's summary judgment motion on the grounds that the pollution exclusion
clause precluded any duty to defend. See id.
102. See id. at 77.
103. See id. Specifically, TIG argued that under the policy term affording
specified liability for actions seeking damages against the insured, a third party's
demand that a policyholder clean up someone else's property does not seek "dam-
ages," and a PRP letter is not a "suit." See id. The Stamford Wallpaper court also
explained that in order to determine whether a claim letter is a "suit," or whether a
third party's environmental cleanup demands can constitute "damages," it would
have to predict how the Connecticut Supreme Court would rule. See id. at 77.
Because the holding was limited to the pollution exclusion clause, the court de-
clined to reach these issues. See id. Therefore, the Second Circuit assumed that
the underlying claims constituted "suits" seeking "damages." See id. The Second
Circuit, therefore, dismissed TIG's cross appeal as moot. See id.
104. See id. at 80-81.
105. See id. The Second Circuit applied Connecticut law to this action. See id.
For a discussion of the applicable law applied in a duty to defend claim, see supra
note 42 and accompanying text.
106. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 81.
107. See id. at 79. The Second Circuit stated that it would "apply state law to
determine the applicability of an insurance policy to an action brought under
CERCLA." Id. (citing New York v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 788 (2d Cir. 1994)).
108. See id. For a detailed discussion of the insurer's duty to defend, see supra
notes 34-85 and accompanying text.
1999]
19
Tita: And the Wallpaper Comes Crumbling Down: Pollution Exclusion Claus
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1999
536 VILLANOVA ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. X: p. 517
in an action . . . states a cause of action against the insured which
appears to bring the claimed injury within the policy coverage, it is
the contractual duty of the insurer to defend the insured in that
action . . . regardless of the duty of the insurer to indemnify.'] 1 09
The Stamford Wallpaper court further explained that the existence of
a duty to defend is determined according to the language found
within the four corners of the complaint.110 Additionally, the court
determined that the nature of the duty to defend is purely contrac-
tual, circumscribed by the language of the insurance contract. u
Next, the Second Circuit examined the scope of the TIG insur-
ance policy's coverage.11 2 The court addressed whether any of the
claims against Stamford included an allegation that fell "even possi-
bly" within the scope of the policy, as limited by the pollution exclu-
sion and the "sudden and accidental" exception to that
exclusion. 113 The Second Circuit agreed with the district court's
determination that none of the claims against Stamford contained
such an allegation." 4
The Second Circuit then determined that the burden of prov-
ing the applicability of a contract term falls upon the insurer. 1 5
According to the Stamford Wallpaper court, TIG demonstrated that
the CERCLA claims sought to impose liability upon Stamford for
environmental loss that was caused by the discharge of "waste
109. Id. (quoting Keithan v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 267 A.2d 660,
665-66 (Conn. 1970)).
110. See id. The court stated that the existence of a duty is "'not affected by
facts disclosed by independent investigation, including those that undermine or
contradict the injured party's claim.'" Id. (quoting Cole v. East Hartford Estates
Ltd. Partnership, No. CV950547179S, 1996 WL 292135, at *2 (Conn. Super. May
15, 1996)). For a discussion of the "four corners of the complaint test," see supra
notes 35-37 & 73-85 and accompanying text.
111. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 79. The Stamford Wallpaper court
stated, "'[t] here is no common law duty as to which the courts are free to devise
rules.'" Id. (quoting Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No.
CV91-0396432S, 1995 WL 462270, at *5 (Conn. Super. July 25, 1995)).
112. See id. The TIG policy extended to "any suit seeking damages on account
of... property damage." Id. The Stamford Wallpaper court stated, however, that
"the pollution exclusion carves out suits arising from the 'discharge, dispersal, re-
lease or escape' of 'pollutants into or upon land, the atmosphere or any water
course or body of water,' except where 'such discharge, dispersal, release or escape
is sudden and accidental.' " Id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. The Stamford Wallpaper court stated that the insurer bears the bur-
den of proof that a contract term, such as the pollution exclusion clause, with-
draws a specific type of liability from coverage. See id. (citing Firestine v.
Poverman, 388 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Conn. 1975)).
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materials . . . into or upon land."116 The court concluded that
neither the PRP letters nor the third-party complaint alleged or
contemplated that Stamford's liability under CERCLA arose from
any activity other than the carters deposit of waste materials in the
ordinary course of Stamford's business. 117
The Second Circuit next considered Stamford's argument that
the claims fell outside of the scope of the pollution exclusion
clause.' 18 According to the Stamford Wallpaper court, the language
of the pollution exclusion clause focused not on the nature of the
insured's conduct or activities, but rather on the nature of the
property damage. 119 The Second Circuit concluded that because
Stamford's potential liability under CERCLA arose from discharges
of hazardous waste materials into or upon land, namely that Stam-
ford generated waste which ultimately resulted in the hazardous dis-
charges, the claims fell within the pollution exclusion. 120
The Stamford Wallpaper court stressed the general rule that am-
biguity in the language of an insurance policy is construed in favor
of coverage. 121 However, the court held that regardless of the na-
ture of the discharge and regardless of whether or not the actual
polluter was Stamford, TIG clearly intended to exclude from cover-
age damages arising from the discharge of pollutants onto land
which were not "sudden and accidental.' 22
116. Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 79. In so concluding, the Second Circuit
relied upon the PRP letter to Stamford regarding the Gallups Quarry site, which
informed Stamford that:
EPA has reason to believe that you arranged by contract, agreement or
otherwise for disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for
transport for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances found at the
site. By this letter, EPA notifies you of your potential liability with regard
to this matter ....
Id.
117. See id. at 79-80.
118. See id. at 80. Stamford argued that "disposal and treatment" are not
equivalent to "discharge, dispersal, release or escape," as the pollution exclusion
describes. Id. In the alternative, Stamford argued that even if the clause was con-
strued to include "disposal and treatment," it did not apply to the act of arranging
for the transport, treatment or disposal of waste materials. See id.
119. See id. The court stated that "[t]he policy excludes coverage for damages
arising from the discharge of waste materials; it does not specify the manner in
which such discharge is carried out, or that it be executed by Stamford directly as
opposed to its carters or anyone else." Id.
120. See id.
121. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 80. However, this rule does not re-
quire the court to "'indulge in a forced construction[,] ignoring provisions or so
distorting them as to accord a meaning other than that evidently intended by the
parties."' Id. (quoting Heyman Associates No. 1 v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania,
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The Second Circuit also considered whether EPA's allegations
fell within the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion clause. 123 The court stated that "[i]n order for the 'sud-
den and accidental' exception to apply, the allegations within the
four corners of the complaint must raise the possibility that the
event which caused the pollution-related property damage was sud-
den and accidental."'124 The Stamford Wallpaper court noted that the
CERCLA claims in the PRP letters and third-party complaint al-
leged that Stamford disposed of waste through carters, who depos-
ited portions of this waste in the various landfills. 125 According to
the Second Circuit, "[t]here is nothing accidental about such an
arrangement." 126 Moreover, the court recognized that under Con-
necticut law, "sudden" has a temporal element.127 Therefore,
based upon the PRP letters and the third-party complaint, the Stam-
ford Wallpaper court concluded that there was nothing to suggest
that Stamford's liability resulted from anything other than disposal
of waste over an extended period of time, which clearly did not fall
within the "sudden and accidental" exception. 128
The Stamford Wallpaper court next discussed the rule of New
York v. Blank, that if there is a possibility that the allegations were
caused by a sudden and accidental event, then coverage is not pre-
cluded. 129 The Second Circuit refused to hypothesize or imagine
123. See id. Stamford argued that the "sudden and accidental" exception to
the pollution exclusion clause obligated TIG to provide a defense. See id. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut has not addressed the question of who shoulders
the burden of proving the applicability of an exception to an exclusion. See id. In
this case, the Second Circuit did not need to decide this issue since TIG had met
the burden. See id.
124. Id. (citing EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 898 F. Supp. 952, 961-62 (D.
Conn. 1995)).
125. See id. (stating that "[e]ach CERCLA claim references Stamford's dispo-
sal of waste through the carters, who deposited portions of this waste in the various
landfills").
126. Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 80. The Stamford Wallpaper court charac-
terized this arrangement as being in the "ordinary course of business." Id.
127. See id. The Stamford Wallpaper court stated that "'case law instructs that
releases of pollutants, occurring not as the result of a sudden event but ... as a
matter of course in the daily operation of [a] plant' are not 'sudden' within the
meaning of the 'sudden and accidental' exception." Id. (quoting EDO, 878 F.
Supp. at 376).
128. See id. at 80-81.
129. See id. at 81. Stamford urged the court to adopt the approach taken by
the court in New York v. Blank. See id. Stamford claimed that the "sudden and
accidental" exception "saves its coverage because the claims 'do not rule out the
possibility' that the contamination was caused by a sudden and accidental event."
Id. The Second Circuit, however, refused to look beyond the four corners of the
complaint to consider hypothetical circumstances that might defeat coverage. See
id. For a discussion of Blank, see supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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episodes or events that could not be found among the allegations
and could not reasonably be deduced from them.130 The court
held that neither the third-party complaint nor the PRP letters
stated or supported the inference that the cause of the property
damage was sudden and accidental.131
The Second Circuit therefore affirmed the judgment of the
district court and denied Stamford's motion for partial summary
judgment, dismissing its breach of contract claim.1 32
V. CRITICAL ANALYSIS
While the Second Circuit's conclusions were legally sound, the
Stamford Wallpaper court neglected to clearly delineate the steps
taken in a duty to defend analysis. 133 In addition, the court's analy-
sis would have benefitted from additional support for its
conclusions.
A. Insurance Contract Construction
Although the Second Circuit properly determined that it need
not indulge in a forced construction of the CGL policy, thereby
ignoring provisions so as to accord the policy a new meaning, the
court failed to specifically address the canons of insurance policy
construction.13 4 In making its determination, the court applied
Connecticut's second canon of insurance contract interpretation:
that insurance policies are to be construed in accordance with ordi-
nary parlance. 13 5 However, the Stamford Wallpaper court neglected
to recognize and apply the other two canons of insurance contract
construction as laid out in Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mutual In-
130. See id. The Stamford Wallpaper court explained that the purpose and
force of a pollution exclusion clause depends on the courts not defeating that
clause by imagining any sudden accident that is not actually foreclosed by the alle-
gation found in the underlying complaint. See id.
131. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 81. For argument's sake, the Stamford
Wallpaper court considered the PRP letters to be "suits" for "damages." See id.
132. See id.
133. For a discussion of Connecticut's three-step process used in a duty to
defend analysis, see supra notes 34-85 and accompanying text.
134. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 80.
135. See id.; see also Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp.
1406 (discussing canons of insurance policy interpretation under Connecticut
law). For a discussion of the canons of insurance contract construction, see supra
notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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surance Co., which would have provided additional support for the
Second Circuit's interpretation of CGL policy language. 136
B. Analysis of the Plain Language of the Pollution Exclusion
Clause and "Sudden and Accidental" Exception
1. Pollution Exclusion Clause
The Stamford Wallpaper court correctly determined that Stam-
ford's allegations fell outside of the pollution exclusion clause, how-
ever, its reasoning for this conclusion was unpersuasive. 13 7 The
Second Circuit reasoned that the language of the exclusion focused
on the nature of the property damage, not on the nature of the
insured's conduct or activities. 138 However, most courts, in deter-
mining whether the pollution exclusion clause bars coverage, have
concluded that the focus of the pollution exclusion clause is on the
nature of the discharge, not the nature of the resulting damage. l3 9
While it is true that whether the insured's conduct was intended or
unintended is not dispositive, the nature of the conduct that results
in the discharge is paramount in determining whether the pollu-
tion exclusion applies.' 40 Therefore, the Stamford Wallpaper court
should have focused on the nature of Stamford's conduct, not the
resulting damage, to determine whether the pollution exclusion
applied.
136. See Remington Arms, 810 F. Supp. at 1410; see also Firestine v. Poverman,
388 F. Supp. 948, 951 (D. Conn. 1975) (applying three canons of insurance policy
interpretation under Connecticut law).
137. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 80.
138. See id. (stating that the "policy excludes coverage for damages arising
from the discharge of waste materials; it does not specify the manner in which such
discharge is carried out, or that it be executed by Stamford directly as opposed to
its carters or anyone else").
139. See Mary Kay Vyskocil, Insurance Coverage Disputes Arising Out of Environ-
mental Litigation, in INSURANCE, ExcEss, AND REINSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES 1990,
at 71, 101 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H-4-5083,
1990) (citing Technicon Elecs. Corp. v. American Home Assurance Co., 544
N.Y.S.2d 531 (1989)). According to some commentators, the proper focus of the
pollution exclusion is on the discharge or release of pollutants into the environ-
ment. See id.; see also Olin Corp. v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 762 F. Supp. 548, 561
(S.D.N.Y. 1991) (explaining that focus of inquiry in pollution exclusion clause is
upon whether discharge of pollutants, not resulting damage, was intended or
expected).
140. See Olin Corp., 762 F. Supp. at 561; see also Technicon Elecs., 544 N.Y.S.2d at
533-34 (stating that "the pollution exclusion clause, by its own terms, does not
distinguish between intended or unintended consequences of intentional dis-
charges; rather, it excludes from coverage liability based on all intentional dis-
charges of waste whether consequential damages were intended or unintended");
Fireman's Fund Ins. Cos. v. Ex-Cell-O Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1317, 1326 (E.D. Mich.
1988) (stating that "[t]he focus of the pollution exclusion is on discharge or re-
lease of pollutants into the environment").
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2. "Sudden and Accidental" Exception
The Second Circuit correctly ruled that the "sudden and acci-
dental" exception includes a temporal element under Connecticut
law. 14 1 Although states are split on the proper construction of the
"sudden and accidental" exception, the few cases that exist in Con-
necticut support the Stamford Wallpaper court's interpretation. 14 2
Since the "sudden and accidental" exception is the most liti-
gated aspect of the standard pollution exclusion clause, and a split
exists among jurisdictions in defining this clause, the Stamford Wall-
paper court's opinion could have benefitted from a more detailed
analysis. 143 For example, in the lengthy Linemaster opinion, the Su-
perior Court of Connecticut carefully detailed the steps taken in a
duty to defend analysis. 144 The Linemaster court provided the his-
tory and public policy concerns surrounding the "sudden and acci-
dental" clause to provide the necessary context and background for
a discussion of the case and of the policy language. 14 5 The
141. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 80. For a discussion of the Stamford
Wallpaper court's reasoning in holding that "sudden" includes a temporal element,
see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
142. See Carrier Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., No. CV-88-352383-S, 1994 WL
547736, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Sept. 21, 1994) (discussing "sudden" as containing
temporal element under Connecticut law). In analyzing the pollution exclusion
clause and the "sudden and accidental" exception, Connecticut law mirrors New
York law, which defines "sudden" with a temporal connotation. See Olin Corp., 762
F. Supp. at 560 (stating that "sudden" could not include events which happened
gradually under both Connecticut and New York law and asserting that interpreta-
tion of "sudden" as having temporal element is emerging as majority view); see also
EDO Corp. v. Newark Ins. Co., 878 F. Supp. 366, 373-74 (D. Conn. 1995) (noting
that under both Connecticut and New York law, "sudden" has temporal connota-
tion and is opposite of gradual). For a discussion of the split among the courts in
defining the "sudden and accidental" exception, see supra notes 55-63 and accom-
panying text.
143. For a detailed discussion of the history surrounding the "sudden and
accidental" exception, see supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
144. See Linemaster Switch Corp. v. Aetna Life & Cas. Corp., No. CV91-
0396432S, 1995 WL 462270, at *5-7 (Conn. Super. July 25, 1995). For a discussion
of the Linemaster case, see supra notes 43-46, 69-72 & 83-85 and accompanying text.
145. See Linemaster, 1995 WL 462270, at *28-30. In stressing the importance of
the suddenness requirement, the Linemaster court quoted the following:
The suddenness requirement of accident-based coverage served two pur-
poses. By limiting coverage to accidents distinct in time and place, the
suddenness requirement simplified claim administration. It set discrete
units to which notice requirements, policy periods, and liability limits ap-
plied. More importantly, the insurers designed the suddenness require-
ment to avoid the "moral hazard" that inhered in insurance coverage for
gradual losses. A gradual loss, the insurers thought, could go undetected
until it reached catastrophic proportions and, once manifested, often
could not be traced to its source. By the time the loss was detected, the
insured might long since have left the scene. Even if the insured planned
on staying, he would be more likely to engage in activity that caused grad-
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Linemaster court analyzed the history, policy concerns, and relevant
case law, and concluded that a plain reading of the policy language
supported the notion of giving a temporal definition to the word
"sudden. '146 Thus, the Second Circuit should have supported its
conclusion that "sudden" has a temporal element with additional
case law.
C. Four Corners of Complaint Analysis
The Stamford Wallpaper court correctly set forth the general
rule regarding the insurer's duty to defend, and properly con-
cluded that TIG had no duty to defend Stamford. 147 In adopting
the "four corners of the complaint" test, the Second Circuit fol-
lowed the trend of refusing to look beyond the complaint to deter-
mine policy coverage. 148 However, the Stamford Wallpaper court
incorrectly distinguished New York v. Blank, the case that Stamford
relied upon for finding a duty to defend.
In discussing Blank, the Stamford Wallpaper court stated that
"Stamford urges us to adopt an alternative approach to construc-
tion of the 'sudden and accidental' exception. 1 49 Stamford ar-
gued, however, basing its position on Blank, that its claims "do not
ual losses if he thought he would never be caught. Thus, the insured
would have a greater incentive to pollute if his policy covered gradual
losses. The insurer wished to discourage the insured from acting on that
temptation.
Id. at 28 (quoting Rosenkranz, supra note 28, at 1242.) In addition, the Linemaster
court stressed that as a matter of public policy, it is important to adhere to a strict
regime of environmental protection by upholding uniformity in interpretation of
the language in CGL policies. See id.
146. See id. at *30. The Linemastercourt reasoned that the motive behind judi-
cial rewriting of the CGL policies by not analyzing "sudden" as having a temporal
element was to protect blameless businesses. See id. Although the court found this
motive understandable, it did not believe this narrow conception of public policy
to be appropriate. See id.
In addition, the Linemaster court reviewed and rejected the cases that held
"sudden" as mere surplusage. See id. at *30-31. The Linemaster court also reviewed
and rejected the cases that refused to give explicit temporal significance to the
term "sudden." See id. at *30-32.
147. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 79, 81 (reciting "four corners" test).
148. See id. at 79 (adopting "four corners" approach regarding duty to defend
issue). Although there is little case law or commentary that defends the complaint
rule, most courts utilize it anyway, perhaps because of its nearly universal accept-
ance. See Randall, supra note 35, at 244 (stating that "[t]he real reason for the
complaint rule . . .appears to be judicial reluctance to let insurers make factual
determinations about their contractual obligations without judicial oversight or
approval"). For a discussion of the "four corners of the complaint" rule, and
courts that follow this approach, see supra notes 35-37 & 73-85 and accompanying
text.
149. Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 81. For a discussion of the Blank case, see
supra notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
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rule out the possibility" that the contamination was caused by a
"sudden and accidental" event. 150 This argument is not based on
reconstructing the "sudden and accidental" exception, but instead,
is a duty to defend argument, for Stamford was, in essence, con-
tending that the claims asserted in the complaint could possibly fall
within coverage. 15 1 Although the Stamford Wallpaper court's final
conclusion was sound, it failed to recognize that its reasoning was
based on a duty to defend analysis, and not on a reconstruction of
the "sudden and accidental" exception.1 52
The Stamford Wallpaper court could generally have benefitted
from additional case law to support its position. For example, in
Linemaster, the court went through a similar analysis and reached
the same result as the Stamford Wallpaper court, that the insurer had
no duty to defend its insured in an environmental damage claim.153
In so doing, the Linemaster court utilized an appropriate amount of
case law in reaching its precise conclusion. 54 Additional support
would have strengthened and clarified the Stamford Wallpaper
decision.
150. Id. In Blank, the Second Circuit reasoned that the insurer had a duty to
defend, since the allegations of the complaint were couched in general terms and
did not rule out the possibility that the pollution occurred "suddenly or acciden-
tally." See New York v. Blank, 27 F.3d 783, 791 (2d Cir. 1994).
151. To determine whether an insurer has breached its duty to defend under
Connecticut law, the reviewing court must examine the claims brought against the
insured, and determine if, on their face, the claims appear to come within the
ambit of the insurance policy. See Remington Arms Co. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.,
810 F. Supp. 1406, 1415 (D. Conn. 1992). Thus, the determination of whether
TIG had a duty to defend depends on whether the complaint by Stamford stated
facts that appeared to bring the claim of damage within the policy coverage. See id.
Here, Stamford alleged that the claims against it could potentially fall within the
policy coverage. See Stamford Wallpaper, 138 F.3d at 81.
152. See id. The Stamford Wallpaper court refused to conjure up an event that
would possibly trigger coverage. See id. An example would be that "a carter's truck
suddenly overturned at the site and accidentally spilled its contents here instead of
there, or that the pollutants suddenly and accidentally escaped from some contain-
ment basin or tank, and reached some of the polluted property by that route." Id.
However, "no allegation in the third-party complaint or the PRP letters gives one a
reason to think that such a thing happened." Id. The Second Circuit completed
its analysis with strict duty to defend language:
We do not look beyond the four comers of a pleading even to take ac-
count of demonstrable circumstances that might defeat coverage: by the
same token, we will not hypothesize or imagine episodes or events that
cannot be found among the allegations, and cannot reasonably be de-
duced from them. The pollution exclusion would lose all force if it could
be defeated by the mere imagining of any sudden accident that is not
actually foreclosed by the allegations of the underlying complaint.
Id.
153. For a discussion of the duty to defend analysis of the Linemaster case, see
supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
154. See generally Linemaster, 1995 WL 462270.
1999]
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VI. IMPACT
The Second Circuit's decision in Stamford Wallpaper does little
to resolve whether an insurance company has a duty to defend its
insured for environmental claims brought under CERCLA, and
may even confuse the issue. 155 This holds true even though the
Second Circuit reached the proper result in resolving the duty to
defend action. By failing to provide a detailed and structured anal-
ysis, the Second Circuit essentially made it more difficult for liti-
gants bringing duty to defend claims under Connecticut law to
understand exactly what they need to prove in order to prevail.1 56
This confusion is by no means confined to Connecticut. The
difficulty faced by courts in resolving these disputes is due to the
fact that when insurers were writing CGL policies, they did not an-
ticipate that a statute, such as CERCILA, would be enacted that
would create retroactive strict liability with enormous costs for pol-
lution cleanup.1 57 In the aftermath of CERCLA's enactment, courts
provide the only possible forum to resolve these uncertainties. 158
With its imprecise analysis, the Stamford Wallpaper decision will only
foster this industry-wide uncertainty that currently exists.
The Second Circuit, by construing "sudden" as containing a
temporal element, added an element of consistency in the interpre-
tation of the "sudden and accidental" exception to the pollution
exclusion clause. 159 Connecticut litigants will have a clearer picture
155. As the Superior Court of Connecticut stated in Linemaster, "[u]ncertainty
is also anathema to companies, the insureds, who face environmental regulation
because of the high risk industrial activity they are often engaged in." Id. at *3.
156. For a discussion of the Stamford Wallpaper court's analysis, see supra notes
107-132 and accompanying text.
157. See Thad R. Mulholland, The Saga of the Pollution Exclusion Clause: How a
"Sudden" Change Occurred Gradually, 2 Miss. ENvrL. L. & POL'Y REV. 26, 27 (1994)
(discussing issues confronting insurers and insureds in pollution damages claims).
The policy language that courts and litigants must struggle with was written long
before the problem to which it is now applied was even conceived. See Linemaster,
1995 WL 462270, at *2.
158. See id. at *3. The Linemaster court stated that:
[T] he courts are perhaps the worst forums within which to resolve these
matters because no matter how right or wrong a particular decision may
appear to one or the other party, it only adds to the uncertainty in the
area as a whole since there are divergent opinions being issued or already
issued all over the country. A particular litigant may achieve certainty but
this only adds to the uncertainty generally since insurance companies and
often the business and industrial litigants they oppose operate across state
lines.
Id.
159. For a discussion of the "sudden and accidental" exception, see supra
notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
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of what types of claims could potentially fall within the "sudden and
accidental" exception.
160
In sum, the Stamford Wallpaper court failed to adhere to the
analyses provided by existing precedent. Without the existence of
industry-wide understandings between insureds and insurers on
how to decide these issues, the courts are heavily relied on to pro-
vide consistency. 161 Ideally, the Supreme Court of Connecticut will
soon rule on the issue of insurance policy interpretation to help
resolve the inconsistencies and lack of guidelines that currently ex-
ist in Connecticut surrounding the duty to defend environmental
claims.
Stephanie M. Tita
160. See Gooley, supra note 2, at 161-62 (discussing varying judicial interpreta-
tions and applications of insurance policy language contributing to insurers' and
insureds' uncertainty about liability).
161. See Linemaster, 1995 WL 462270, at *2. The Linemaster court stated that
industry-wide agreements are not feasible because disputing parties would have to
come to an agreement while enormous claims remained an issue between them.
See id. Additionally, the nature of CERCLA remedies does not provide a particular
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